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REGULATION OF BusINEss-D1scRIMINATORY PRACTICES IN THB
FoRM OF ADVERTISING Ar.LowANcEs, SERVICES, AND FACILITIES UNDER THB RoBINSON-PATMAN AcT-With the growth of the chain store
system of distribution, massive buying power was often used to exact
price concessions, enabling large-scale distributors to undersell smaller
concerns and independent retailers.1 The Robinson-Patman Act,2 an
amendment of section 2 of the Clayton Ad:,3 was prompted by this
economic development of the twenties. A report by the Federal Trade
Commission described several kincls of discriminatory concessions extracted by chain stores and stated that the trend toward final chain
store supremacy and dominance was apparently uncheckable. 4 It

See ZoRN AND FELDMAN, BusxNEss UNDER THE NEw PRICE LAws (1937).
49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §13. In general on the RobinsonPatman Act see Copeland, "The Problem of Administering the Robinson-Patman Act,"
15 HA:Rv. Bus. REv. 156 (1937); Learned and Isaacs, "The Robinson-Patman Law:
Some Assumptions and Expectations," 15 HARv. Bus. REv. 137 (1937); McAllister,
"Price Control by Law in the United States," 4 I.Aw AND CoNTBM. PROB. 273 (1937);
ZoRN AND FELDM:AN, BusINEss UNDER THE NEw PRICE LAws (1937); PATMAN, THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1938); N.Y. STATE BAR AssN., RoBINSON-PATM:AN ACT SYMPOSIA
(1946, 1947, 1948); Adelman, ''Effective Competition and the Anti-Trust Laws," 61 HARv.
L. REv. 1289 (1948); Haslett, "Price Discriminations and Their Justifications under the
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936," 46 MxcH. L. REv. 450 (1948); OPPENHEIM, PRICE AND
SERVICE DxsCRIMINATIONS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1949); AusTIN, PRICE
DISCRThllNATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1950);
Fuchs, "The Requirement of Exactness in the Justification of Price and Service Differentials Under the Robinson-Patman Act," 30 Tex:. L. REv. 1 (1951); Rowe, "Price
Discriminations, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman,'' 60
YALE L. J. 929 (1951).
s 38 Stat. L. 730 (1914), as amended by 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936) and 64 Stat. L.
1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §§12-17, 15 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §18.
4 FEDERAL TRADE CoMMissmN, FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE lNv:BsTIGATION
(1934).
l
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was chiefly to restore equality of opportunity in business that the
Robinson-Patman Act was enacted. The act outlaws discriminations
in price between competing purchasers in interstate commerce where
such differentials cannot be justified by differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery, resulting from the methods or quantities of
sale or delivery. 5 The act singles out three disguised forms of discrimination: brokerage allowances, advertising allowances, and services or facilities granted to the buyers. This comment will deal solely
with the last two forms of discrimination prohibited by sections 2(d)
and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act,6 and will attempt to illustrate
the present state of the law and offer a possible alternative construction
and method of implementation of these sections. A recent ruling of
the FTC in a group of cases7 appears to be significant with respect
to controversial aspects of sections 2(d) and (e), and indicative of
the present attitude of the Commission in the search for an adequate
standard by which honest businessmen may keep within the confines
of the law. These cases will be discussed in relation to past decisions
and to an analysis of sections 2(d) and (e), as to their reach, function,
and rationale in the overall scope of the act.
5 "Sec. 2. (a) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, • • • and where the effect
of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
the customers of either of them: Pr011ided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent
differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture,
sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered.•••" 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15
U.S.C. (1946) §13(a).
6 "[Sec. 2.]
(d) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce
to pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer
of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for
any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the
processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured,
sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution
of such products or commodities.
"(e) That it shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with or
without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the
furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or
offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms." 49 Stat. L. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §13
(d) and (e).
7 Lever Brothers Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 5585 (December 1953); The Proctor and Gamble
Distributing Co. and The Proctor and Gamble Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 5586 (December 1953);
Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 5587 (December 1953). For convenience these
cases will be referred to as the Soap Cases.
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I. The Public Utility Features of the Robinson-Patman Act
Viewed in its historical setting, the Robinson-Patman Act marked
a shift from the general philosophy of other antitrust legislation. The
Clayton Act had prohibited price discrimination undermining competition among sellers rather than among buyers.8 A proviso of section 2 of that act allowed discriminations "on account of differences
. . . in quantity in the commodity sold." Thus, by using quantity
discounts, sellers could price-discriminate at pleasure. The lesson of
the Clayton Act resulted in an effort to avoid loopholes in the new
act. The scope of the proscribed practices was broadened to an extent perhaps not wholly realized even by the framers of the RobinsonPatman Act. First, a special relationship was established between
sellers and buyers in interstate commerce. Duties were imposed on
both sides not only as "between" each other, but "among" them also.
This phase of regulation of business could not be said to upset familiar
forms of trade regulation. The remarkable innovation in this area
was the open condemnation of practices that could be justified on
sound economic bases, in order to protect the chances of survival of
small business. One example is a provision of section 2( a) empowering the FTC to set quantity limits on commodities where larger
purchasers are so few that differentials in price based on quantity sales
result in discrimination and are promotive of monopoly.9 To support
the constitutionality of this provision, an analogy was drawn from
the field of public utilities, namely transportation, where the Interstate Commerce Commission prohibited special rates for more than
one carload, even though a cost saving could be shown.10 Section
2(c), the ''brokerage" clause, in practice proscribes payment or receipt
s In one case the Supreme Court took the position that the Clayton Act forbade the
lessening of competition among the buyers, too. George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American
Can Co., 278 U.S. 245, 49 S.Ct. 112 (1929).
9 Sec. 2(a) provides that the Commission may " ••• fix and establish quantity
limits . • • as to particular commodities or classes of commodities, where it finds that
available purchasers in greater quantities are so few as to render differentials on account
thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any line of commerce; and
the foregoing shall then not be construed to permit differentials . • • in quantities greater
than those so fixed and established.••." 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1946)
§13(a). The economic philosophy of the proviso is stated in S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d sess., p. 6 (1936): "It rests upon the principle that where even an admitted
economy is of a character that is possible only to a very few units of overshadoiving size in a
particular trade or industry, it may become in their hands nonetheless the food upon
which monopoly feeds, a proboscis through which it saps the lifeblood of its competitors;
and that in forbidding its use and foregoing its benefits the public is but paying a willing
price for its freedom from monopoly control." Emphasis supplied.
l0Jnterstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 145 U.S. 263, 12
S.Ct. 844 (1892); Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Chicago & Erie R. Co., 19 I.C.C.
592 (1910).
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of brokerage by either party to a sale, or by their agents or representatives, at least in connection with that sale.11 In one case, direct
buying was held not to warrant a brokerage fee, although the court
recognized that such a form of buying may result in a benefit to the
seller.12
It is apparent that in its protection of competition, the RobinsonPatman Act did not confine itself to a castigation of improper, predatory practices. The act thrust forward into the field of semi-managed
economic relations. The elements of protectionism in the abovementioned sections of the act are present in the legislative history
and the language of sections 2(d) and (e) as well.13 These sections
deny the buyer a benefit even though earned through services fully
rendered by him, if such benefit is not "available" or "accorded" to
competing buyers on "proportionally equal terms." The wisdom of
the philosophy of the Robinson-Patman Act in its public utility treatment of commercial intercourse as a departure from a purely competitive approach grounded on considerations of mere economics is
not within the scope of this comment.14

II. Vicissitudes of the "Proportionally Equal Terms" Formula
Under sections 2(d) and (e),1 5 the courts and the FTC have held
that a seller must tailor his cooperative advertising plan in such a way
as to permit all buyers, large and small, to take advantage of some
form of an allowance for services.16 In short, the evil consisting in
11 Representative Utterback commented on the brokerage clause: "Where sales are
made from buyer to seller [sic], in the nature of the case no brokerage services are
rendered by either, and no payment or allowance on account thereof can be made by
either party to the other." 80 CoNG. REc. 9418 (1936).
12 Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, ( 4th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 607.
See in
general as to the brokerage clause, Oppenheim, "Administration of the Brokerage Provision of the Robinson-Patman Act," 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 511 (1940).
13 A House Committee report, referring to these sections of the act, stated that advertising allowances or services can be unjust even in cases where not excessive and given
for services actually rendered. See H. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 15-16
(1936). Normally, even in the case of fiduciaries, the shift to the seller of the cost of
advertising of the buyer's own business, when the consideration paid is fair, would be
regarded as a legitimate return for services rendered the seller in promoting and advertising his products.
14 For a comprehensive treatment of this problem in relation to legislation germane
to the Robinson-Patman Act, see Oppenheim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts
to a Revised National Antitrust Policy," 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139 (1952).
15 See note 6 supra.
16 Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., (8th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 988,
cert. den. 326 U.S. 773, 66 S.Ct. 231 (1945); Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, (2d Cir.
1946) 156 F. (2d) 132; Binney and Smith, 32 F.T.C. 315 (1942); Luxor, Ltd., 31 F.T.C.
658 (1940); United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939). See especially FELDMAN AND ZoRN, ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES (1948).
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the discrimination against customers who either could supply services
or are secretly excluded has been interpreted to have been cured by
compelling a seller either to abandon cooperative advertising or to
offer to hire all of his competing customers as his advertising agents
in some form. Since the granting of equal payments and services
would amount to discrimination among buyers of different quantities
and buyers differently situated, the act adopts the standard of proportionality. This standard has vexed the courts and businessmen
because of its seeming indefiniteness in a field where subjective and
objective factors bulk equally large. Several commentators have attempted to define the meaning of "proportionally equal terms." Senator Logan indicated that advertising allowances should be based on
the dollar quantity of goods purchased by each buyer.17 Other commentators have advanced the opinion that subjective factors should
be taken into account in formulating a plan of cooperative advertising
under the law.18
A sensible view as to the meaning and scope of the phrase, and
one which seems tci be increasingly accepted, was expressed by Representative Patman, when he said that good faith or lack of it in trying
to deal fairly with buyers furnishes the best test in a cooperative
advertising scheme.19
Opponents of the formula have severely attacked the seeming futility of a standard so difficult to evaluate. Professor Oppenheim has
branded the "proportionally equal terms" formula a "legislative monstrosity" which "should not be embalmed in the statute because it
imposes an unworkable administrative burden on the Commission."20
Commenting on sections 2(d) and (e), Congressman Utterback,
floor leader for the Patman bill, remarked:
"The existing evil at which this part of the bill is aimed is, of
course, the grant of discriminations under the guise of payments
17 80 CoNG. REc. 3231 (1936).
18 See Smith, "The Patman Act

in Practice," 35 MICH. L. REv. 705 at 726-727
(1937); Carter, ''Validity of Demonstrator Practice under Section 2(d) and (e)," N.Y.
STATE BAR AssN., ROBINSON-PATMAN Ac:r SYMPOSIUM 91 (1946); Layton, "Demonstrators on Proportionally Equal Terms," N.Y. STATE BAR AssN., RoBINSON-PATMAN Ac:r
SYMPOSIUM 38 (1948); Montague, "Proportionately Equal Terms," N.Y. STATE BAR
AssN., RoBINSON-PATMAN Ac:r SYMPOSIUM 51 (1948).
19 "But the strongest defense that any seller can offer, to show that his yardsticks
have been set up in good faith, is evidence that he has not discriminated between types
and classes of customers as well as between customers of the same class. For it was such
discrimination, the widespread favoring of chains as against independent buyers, that gave
rise to the inclusion in the Act of the particular clause under discussion." PATMAN, nm
ROBINSON-PATMAN Ac:r 141 (1938).
20 Oppenheim, "Should the Robinson-Patman Act Be Amended?" N.Y. STATE BAR
AssN., ROBINSON-PATMAN Ac:r SYMPOSIUM 141 at 146 (1948).
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for advertising and promotional services which, whether or not
the services are actually rendered as agreed, results in an advantage to the customer so favored as compared with others who have
to bear the cost of such services themselves."21

It is apparent that the evil sought to be cured was one involving
a monetary question only. Since the act was aimed at preventing
unjustifiable rebates (monetary in character), it would seein a fair
inference that to satisfy sections 2(d) and (e), it would not be necessary to devise a plan which would enable all buyers to give some
advertising services. As long as the payments or the services are openly
announced and made known to all and the opportunity to participate
is given to those wishing to cooperate in the advertising plan, sections
2(d) and (e) are satisfied. A system of compensatory rates (monetary in character) could bridge the gap left open by allotment of
payments and services to some and not to others. The difference,
if left uncompensated, would be a simple "indirect" discrimination
in price, which could be prosecuted under section 2(a), where reasonable possibility or probability of injury to competition must be
shown.22 Thus, a violation of sections 2(d) and (e) would occur
and would result in per se illegality only in the cases that actually
prompted the enactment of the sections, viz.: where rebates are either
secretly extended and so not "available" to others, or where excessive
payments are made not reB.ecting the value of services supplied, or
where even though the payments are not excessive, the seller refuses
to offer advertising or promotional allowances and services to those
who want to and could provide the "same" service on a proportionate
basis. In these cases, a mere showing of discrimination would certainly warrant the "illegal per se" brand of sections 2(d) and (e),
if we keep in mind the basic philosophy of the act in casting its protective supervision over industry.
A view restricting the proportionality requirement to the same
services and to cases where ability to perform services could be shown
was expressed by the Senate and House Judiciary Committees in
their explanation of "proportionally equal terms."23 Then sections
2(d) and (e) would be in effect analogous to a disguised penalty to
strike at willful improper conduct.
2180 CoNG. REc. 9418 (1936). Emphasis supplied.
22 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 68 S.Ct. 822 (1948).
23 ''The phrase 'proportionally equal terms' • • • is designed to prevent the limitation
of such allowances to single customers on the ground that they alone can furnish the
services or facilities in the quantities specified. Where a competitor can furnish them
in less quantity, but of the same relative value, he seems entitled, and this clause is
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III. Recent Case Law on Cooperative Advertising in Commerce
The foregoing interpretation, however, has not been adopted by
the cases. In the Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. case,24 the court held
that the seller, having once elected the services or facilities he will
furnish or to which he will contribute, assumes the obligation of
extending similar services to all competing purchasers to the extent
required by the statute. The furnishing of a service or facility which
cannot be proportionalized in such a way as to make it reasonably
possible for competing purchasers to avail themselves of it was branded
a failure to accord such services and facilities on proportionally equal
terms. In other words, the court read an additional requirement into
the act, viz., that the services and facilities must not only be available,
but also must be suitable to other competing purchasers. This decision was interpreted by one commentator to compel the seller to
tailor his demonstrator service plan in such a way that it would be
reasonably possible for all his competing customers to participate.25
Another strict interpretation of the language of sec.tion 2(e) is
illustrated by the following passage from the district court decision in
Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can Co.:
" . . . the fact that it is impractical, or even impossible, to
furnish proportionately equal facilities to all customers cannot
serve as a justification for furnishing the facilities to those where
it is practical, if the furnishing of such facilities discriminates in
favor of those receiving them. In other words, section 2(e)
condemns the discrimination, not the furnishing of facilities.
And, the condemnation is just as applicable when the facilities
designed to accord him, the right to a similar allowance commensurate with those facilities.
To illustrate: Where, as was revealed in the hearings earlier referred to in this report,
a manufacturer grants to a particular chain distributor an advertising allowance of a stated
amount per month per store in which the former's goods are sold, a competing customer
with a smaller number of stores, but equally able to furnish the same service per store,
and under conditions of the s§me value to the seller, would be entitled to a similar allowance on that basis." S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d sess., p. 8 (1936).
24 Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., (8th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 988,
cert. den. 326 U.S. 773, 66 S.Ct. 231 (1945).
25 Carter, "Validity of the Demonstrator Practice under Section 2(d) and (e),"
N. Y. STATS BAR AssN., RoBINSON-PATMAN Am: SYMPOSIUM 91 at 97 (1946). The
result would be so absurd that the FTC issued certain rules for the cosmetics and toilet
preparations industry as the outcome of an industry conference, whereby the industry
was allowed to offer alternate, rather than the same, services to satisfy the proportionality
requirement. FTC Trade Practice Rules for the Cosmetic and Toilet Preparation Industry, 16 Fed. Reg. 11,993, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP., 9th ed., ,r20,282 (1951). See 65
HARV. L. REv. 1261 (1952).
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cannot be furnished to all as when they are not furnished to
all."2 ,,
Sections 2(d) and (e) so far have been construed as complementing each other; a violation of one may well be a violation of
the other.27 By the foregoing construction in the cases, sections 2(d)
and (e), conceived as part of an integral plan of legislation against
price discrimination, as expressed in section 2(a), have been separated from the latter and read in a vacuum. The proportionally
equal terms formula, conceived as a rule of fairness, 28 was given the
role of a slide rule.
The recent ruling of the FTC in the Soap Cases2 9 shows, however, a new outlook adopted by the Commission on the proportionalization problem. The cases where the courts and the Commission
had formulated a strict view of sections 2(d) and (e) were cases in
which the seller had either refused similar allowances to or kept them
secret from competing buyers.30 In the Soap Cases, the sellers set
up a detailed, comprehensive plan of cooperative advertising. A genuine effort was shown to comply with the law in graduating the
amounts paid per case of the product bought according to numerous
and small brackets.31 In passing on the validity of this cooperative
20 (D.C. Ark. 1949) 87 F. Supp.
21 Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v.

484 at 498.
Gus Blass Co., (8th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 988,
cert. den. 326 U.S. 773, 66 S.Ct. 231 (1945).
2 8 "There are many ways in which advertising, sales, and other services and facilities
may be either furnished or paid for by the seller upon terms that will at once satisfy
the requirement of the bill concerning equitable treatment of all customers and at the
same time satisfy the legitimate business needs of both the seller and the purchaser." 80
CoNG. Riic. 9419 (1936).
29 See note 7 supra.
3 0Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 132; Com Products
Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 65 S.Ct. 961 (1945); American Cooperative Serum
Assn. v. Anchor Serum Co., (7th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 907 (excessive payments made);
U.S. Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939); Lambert Chemical Co., 31 F.T.C. 734 (1940);
General Baking Co., 38 F.T.C. 307 (1944).
31 One of the plans contemplated a "Cooperative Merchandising Agreement" for one
year, and a "Cooperative Merchandising Plan" for the customers who did not choose the
annual plan. Under the annual contract, the buyer agreed to hold at least nine feature
sales of seller's products to be promoted either in a newspaper or by radio or handbill,
and to be supported by store displays of seller's product. Payment for services was based
on the number of cases of each product bought during the contract period. The amount
paid varied with the product and type of advertising, and ranged from 12½ cents to 20
cents per case for newspaper advertising, and from 8 cents to 9 cents for handbill and
radio advertising. The alternate agreement was expressly designed to accommodate buyers
who did not or could not choose the annual plan; the plan was incorporated with each
individual order. The sellers paid 6 cents for each case purchased and the buyer was to
supply a feature sale supported by a store display. These buyers were given the option
to promote this sale by advertising seller's products through newspapers, radio, handbills,
and receive payment at the per case figure of the annual contract.
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advertising scheme, the FTC took a negative approach. Instead of
making an overcritical scrutiny, it was content :first to notice that no
elements of secrecy or outright favoritism were uncovered by the
evidence. On one phase of the annual contract, even though the
construction suggested by the petitioner was plausible, the Commission adopted the construction most favorable to the sellers, simply for
lack of evidence that any of their actions substantiated petitioner's
contentions.32 Small differences in discounts between the several
brackets of participation were looked upon with favor in connection
with alternate services accepted. This suggests a close analogy to the
standards used in examining the validity of quantity discounts under
section 2(a).33 Contrary to the drastic language of the court in the
Russellville Canning Co. case, the FTC in these later cases has shown
a tendency toward acceptance of comprehensive plans where one type
of services or allowances may clearly be impractical for most customers but where no evidence shows that alternate services or allowances are not within reach of such buyers. A "rule of reason" approach is indicated by a clear statement that the law does not require
that a comprehensive plan must be so tailored that every feature of
it will be suitable for every customer, so long as the plan is not
lopsided.
On the proportionality question, the FTC was again content to
notice that no evidence showed payments in excess of cost, or secret
advances. No affirmative showing of proportionality or disproportionality was attempted. Higher payments for services of higher cost or
value were sanctioned. The recurrence of such words as "good faith,"
"fair," and "reasonable" in the opinion is striking. The Commission
avowed the impossibility of laying down an exact standard of proportionality. Concluding, the Commission announ<;:ed that the plan
must be honest in purpose and fair and reasonable in application.
Thus, the attitude of the Commission is reminiscent of the "rule of
reason" approach used in enforcing some of the standards of section
32 One of the contracts referring to newspaper or handbill advertising provided:
"Advertising space shall at least be equivalent to that given to competitive products and
shall be included in the advertiser's regular consumer advertising." ,Jt was argued that
as some customers did not do that type of advertising, they could not avail themselves of
respondent's offer and consequently the advertising programs were not usable or suitable.
The FTC, after pointing out that the phrase might be construed to require advertising
of respondent's products in the customer's regular consumer advertising only in the event
he did such advertising, adopted the finding of the trial examiner. The finding stated
simply that there was no evidence that an isolated advertisement placed by a customer
would not be considered as regular consumer advertising.
as FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 68 S.Ct. 822 (1948); H. C. Brill Co., Inc.,
26 F.T.C. 666 (1938).
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2(a) of the act. The opinion of the Commission gives the impression that it was perhaps looking for some possible injury to competition, even though disproportionality would suffice for an order of cease
and desist.
The objective volume-of-purchase standard in evaluating proportionality seems still to be favored as the only practical one. However,
the necessity of working out a plan under which all competing buyers
can participate in some form remains unchanged.
While the rulings of the FTC on questions of law are not binding
on the courts, they are persuasive authority. Furthermore, they are
of great practical importance to businessmen now held back by the
fear of inability to meet a rigid application of the proportionality test.
The recent ruling seems to open the door to any bona fide rational
attempt to comply with sections 2(d) and (e) as interpreted to date.

IV. An Alternative Construction and Method of Implementation
From the legislative history of the act and its aims, the inference
seems inescapable that the advertising and services sections are but
ancillary to the main purpose of the act, i.e., prevention of price discrimination, embodied in section 2(a). The proportionality test is
easily criticized for its vagueness and difficulty of irp.plementation, but
it is hard to see how such a concept can be eliminated or defined.
Had the Congress attempted to establish a ratio, there is no doubt
that such ratio might well lend itself to abuses because of the impossibility of precise evaluation of factors in this field. Even if the words
were struck from the books, proportionality would probably be just
as necessary to ensure conformity with the aims of. the act.
The real mischief in the current interpretation and administration
of the Robinson-Patman Act consists in an unnecessary compulsion
placed on suppliers to strive to convert all customers into advertising
agents. The keynote of the statute is "price discrimination." Even
though only a few can afford it, when all competing purchasers are
given an opportunity to enter any plan, sections 2(d) and (e) should
be held to be complied with.34 The concept enabling the FTC to
limit quantity discounts has been needlessly imported by analogical
inference into sections 2(d) and (e). Thus, on the analogy of large
34 While this view is squarely opposed to the position taken by the few court decisions
on the subject, the Supreme Court has never passed on the validity of a system allowing
freedom of choice of advertising means to the sellers as a part of an integrated plan
including possible rebates in the nature of compensation for those unable or unwilling
to participate in cooperative advertising.
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quantity discounts as promotive of discrimination even if economically
justifiable, it is felt that large advertising discounts afforded only by
few are similarly deleterious to competition, even if granted as a fair
consideration for services rendered. One basic difference is not recognized. The quantity limits provision is an exception intended to cover
a practice not only otherwise unimpeachable under any provision of
the act, but expressly sanctioned by the savings justification clause of
section 2(a). An advertising plan, on the other hand, conceived and
patterned to suit only the types of customers a seller believes best
qualified for the kind of services he wants, may meet the standard
of sections 2(d) and (e) if "available" or "accorded" to all alike, but
still may be reached as a plain form of indirect price discrimination
under section 2(a). Under section 2(a), potential or actual injury
to competition is a prerequisite to successful prosecution. The correction of this discrepancy would restore the act to its original function
of protecting buyers against injury to competition, and not against
differential treatment.
Advertising and services allowances are but one element (the same
as shipping expenses, overhead, production cost, etc.) in computing
what a customer will be charged. Then, except where such allowances or services are used as devices to evade section 2(a) as to price
discrimination (secret deals, excessive payments, refusal to willing
buyers), the real question is: as a matter of economic reality, to what
extent does an allowance or service granted reduce the actual price
paid by the circuitous route of intangible advertising benefits to the
buyers themselves? There is no need to become entangled in the
"proportionally equal terms" maze. At this point the problem involves the application of section 2(a), which calls for absolute equality
in price where no savings can be shown.35 Competing buyers here
do not have to be able or willing to render any services of any kind.
Nowhere does the act command blind mass production of advertising.
The nuances and complexities of effective advertising, the diversity
of policies and needs for different kind of products should be apparent
to all. 36 The elimination of subjective appraisals is not only unrealistic,
35 See note 5 supra.
36 "The prestige or

advertising value of certain names in the retail trade is such
that it would justify paying them an allowance for the use of their services and facilities
to demonstrate our goods even if we did not sell any goods in that store. The psychological
and economic reason for this assertion is very simple: a great number of stores make
a policy to sell only high quality merchandise, and, to a large extent, only high priced
goods. However, Coty makes it a policy to sell the highest quality of goods but at
moderate prices. Therefore, the association of the Coty name with names of stores
reputed to sell high quality and high priced merchandise is of inestimable value, because
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but a serious, needless obstacle to honest enterprises. The freedom
enjoyed by a seller before the Robinson-Patman Act was curtailed
only to the extent that an advertising scheme must be open to all who
are capable of using it and willing to do so. Consequently, a seller,
taking into account subjective factors, should be able to tailor his plan
to make it feasible only for a category of customers he regards as
best suited to his purposes. This means that a smaller store favorably located may command a proportionately higher allowance than
a larger store, buying more, but in a less favorable location.37 But this
satisfies only sections 2(d) and (e). The question remains whether
such allowances constitute "indirect" price discrimination under section 2(a).
The practicality of this approach to the problem must be considered in the light of two important developments. First, while the
present attitude of the FTC may be characterized as wise in the face
of an insurmountable administrative burden, it must also be recognized as a retreat from accurate and comprehensive administration of
this part of the act. Secondly, frequent, systematic, unpunished violations of the Robinson-Patman Act have been denounced by competent commentators in the business world. 38 Dealing with the problem as one of indirect price discrimination under section 2(a)39 leaves
the question still one of painful evaluation, but freed on the one hand
of the burden placed on sellers and manufacturers by the practical
necessity of employing almost all their competing customers as advertisers, and on the other of the threat of suppression for speculative
infractions without corresponding actual or potential injury to competition, deplored almost unanimously by writers.40
in the minds of people high quality is usually associated with high prices.

The mere
fact that stores with a policy of featuring only high quality goods display, sell, and advertise Coty products serves to defeat any doubt in the minds of the people that our
products may not be of first class high quality simply because they are sold at moderate
prices, much lower than the same products of other brands and of similar quality." Brief
for Respondent Coty, Inc., pp. 25-26, in Coty, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 4435.
37 "So far as the Act is concerned, the value of services and facilities, rather than the
size of the order or volume of purchases, is a more correct basis for a definition of 'proportionally equal terms'." PATMAN, THB ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 141 (1938).
3 8 See, e.g., Cumming, "Whatever Became of Mr. Patman and Mr. Robinson?"
SALEs MANAGEMENT 37 (Feb. 1950).
39 Authority is not altogether lacking for the view that advertising allowances can
be an indirect price discrimination. In a case where a seller was charged with granting
advertising rebates to some and not to others, the court held that such rebates only lowered
the purchase price and therefore violated §2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. American
Cooperative Serum Assn. v. Anchor Serum Co., (7th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 907 (1946).
40 Oppenheim, "Should the Robinson-Patman Act Be Amended?" N.Y. STATE BAR
AssN., ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr SYMPOSIUM 141 (1948). Rowe, ''Price Discrimination,
Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman," 60 YALE L. J. 929
(1951).
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It cannot become known until an accounting period has elapsed
to what extent a practice has been violative of the policy of the act.
The parties could be induced to evaluate their approximate position
of advantage or disadvantage under an openly announc.ed "available"
plan, and the FTC could pass in disputed cases on the claims of
buyers for retroactive compensation by the sellers to equalize the
prices. This hindsight approach would permit redress where a true
menace to competition is created and would enlist the cooperation of
the real parties in interest in the effectuatiop. of the policies of the
act. A seller could freely pursue his advertising policies subject only
to possible compensation to excluded parties in case the reasonable
probability of injury can be shown. The possibility of retroactive
liability would foster the will of the seller to resist the exorbitant
demands for reductions or allowances of mass-buying concerns. The
system might even discourage such demands, inasmuch as prospective
compensation to excluded buyers would lessen the advantage to be
derived from special concessions. If the idea of responsibility to
buyers savors of managed economy, it cannot be denied that the core
of the act is in keeping with this philosophy.41 Such a retroactive
plan would add elasticity to the administration of the act and to the
interplay of competition. A non-cooperating buyer could feel confident of his ability to prove his claim and compete effectively meanwhile. ]\,fore important, sellers, aware of some buyers' disadvantageous
positions, could grant tentative rebates to them as part of th_eir comprehensive plan or settle by compromise, and the case would never
be litigated.
It is true that advantages bestowed on some might reach such proportions that a compensatory rate would have to be such as to imperil
a seller's profits in some cases. But a question of policy presents
itself at this point: is the seller to be allowed to injure competition by
choosing one or more of his custom~rs as his advertisers? Should the
seller's freedom of choice in promoting his products be more valuable
than the right of retailers to be free from discriminatory practices injurious to competition? The Robinson-Patman Act seems to provide
ample answer to these questions;

V. Conclusion
The Robinson-Patman Act cannot be said to look upon cooperative advertising either with favor or disfavor. The practice has, how41

See part I of this comment.
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ever, brought about a threat to competition, chiefly where it is used
to conceal price discrimination. Today a strange situation exists
because of the construction placed by the courts on sections 2(d)
and (e). The anomaly has been somewhat mitigated in the Soap
Cases by the attitude adopted by the Commission, which now permits "good faith" attempts to meet the requirements of the law. As
a result, the FTC and the courts, before finding violations of the act,
may tend to look for injury to competition more than the language
of sections 2(d) and (e) would warrant under present construction.
This is in keeping with the goal sought by the suggestions outlined
above. It is, however, only the outcome of helplessness in trying to
comply with the proportionality rule, rather than the outcome of a consciousness of the rule's immateriality in certain cases. Relief from
the necessity of Hooding the country with retailers engaged in the
advertising business, under penalty of renouncing cooperative advertising, is still nowhere in sight.
Rinaldo L. Bianchi

